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Background
On August 21, 1970 the House Ways and Means Committee reported
favorably to the House of Representatives its Bill H. R. 18970.1 Title II of
the Bill 2 placed quotas on certain textile and footwear articles to com-
mence in 1971. The President was authorized to exempt from quotas
imports (1) which he determined were not disrupting the U.S. market, (2)
when he determined that the national interest required such action, or (3)
when he found that the supply of such articles in the domestic market was
insufficient to meet demand at reasonable prices. In addition, the President
was authorized to negotiate agreements under which imports of textiles and
footwear would be controlled. Imports covered by such agreements would
also be exempt from quantitative limitations as are imports of cotton textile
articles as a result of the existing Long Term Arrangements on Cotton
Textiles. 3
Nowhere in its Report did the Committee attempt to justify the pro-
posed quotas as coming under any of the GATT 4 exceptions to the prohi-
bition of quotas set forth in Article XI of the GATT.
On October 8, 1970, the Senate Finance Committee announced two
*Member, District of Columbia Bar; Chairman, Committee on Tariffs, Customs and the
GATT, Section of International and Comparative Law, American Bar Association.
'House Report No. 91- 1435 (1970), U.S. Government Printing Office, (hereinafter
referred to as "GPO").
2H. R. 18970, 91st Congress, 2d Session, GPO.
3House Report No. 91- 1435, op. cit., p. 5.4GATT is the abbreviation for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a multilater-
al agreement between governments concerned with international trade. It has been in oper-
ation for some 22 years, since January 1, 1948, pursuant to a Protocol of Provisional
Application. Approximately 80 countries are full contracting parties, others acceded to it
provisionally, some apply it on a de facto basis and some participate under special arrange-
ments. Thus, in one way or another, almost 100 countries are concerned with the application
of GATT in their international trading relations. The GATT is administered by a secretariat
under a Director-General. It has offices at Villa Le Bocage, Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva
10, Switzerland. Its numerous publications, including the GATT agreement itself, are avail-
able through that office. The GATT agreement is also available at the GPO. It would be most
helpful in reading this article to have a copy of the agreement at hand.
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days of hearings on H. R. 18970, commencing the following day and
concluding on Monday, October 12, 1970. Only a few witnesses, including
top Administration spokesmen, were allowed to testify. A number of such
spokesmen objected to various provisions of H. R. 18970, including the
quota provisions for footwear, but reluctantly supported the textile quotas
on the grounds that other solutions had thus far proved unsuccessful. 5 In
neither their opposition to, nor reluctant support of, quotas did any of them
point out the inconsistency of such quota provisions with the international
legal obligations of the United States under Article XI of the GATT. Nor
did the supporters of textile quotas attempt to claim that such quotas came
under any exception to Article XI.
The House passed H. R. 18970 on November 19, 1970 by a vote of 215
for, 165 against, and 54 not voting.6
The Senate Finance Committee attached a somewhat altered H. R.
18970, but with the quota provisions intact, as an amendment to H. R.
17550, a bill to amend the Social Security Act.7 In its Report of December
11, 1970, the Senate Finance Committee made no mention of the in-
consistency of the quota provisions with the international legal obligations
of the United States, nor, again, was there any attempt to claim an ex-
ception for such quotas. 8
When asked about the quota provisions in his news conference on
December 10, 1970, the President stated:
It should be limited to the textile quotas.... The key question is jobs, and it
is all well and good to apply a quota that is going to save jobs in America, but
it doesn't make sense if it is going to cost us more jobs in America because of
cutting down the exports that we make abroad.9
Again, no mention was made of the inconsistency of such a quota with our
international legal obligations under GATT, nor was an exception claimed.
Due to extended debate and complicated parliamentary procedures on
the Senate Floor, the Trade Bill never came to a vote and died when the
91st Congress adjourned on January 2, 1971. It was immediately rumored
that the President would lose no time in resubmitting his trade proposals,
including textile quotas, in the 92nd Congress when it convened on
January 23, 1971.10 Later it was suggested that the Administration would
5 Hearings and Informal Proceedings before the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate,
91st Congress, 2d Session, on Amendments 925 and 1009 to H. R. 17550, October 9 and 12,
1970 (2 Parts), G PO, pp. 1-292 (hereinafter referred to as Hearings).
6116 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD H 10603 (1970).7 H. R. 17550, 91st Congress, 2d Session, GPO.
8Senate Report No. 91- 1431, 9 1 st Congress, 2d Session, G PO.
9The Washington Post, Friday, December Ii, 1970, p. A14.
10The Journal of Commerce, Thursday, December 24, 1970, p. 1.
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probably not send a trade bill to Congress until mid-1971, after the Presi-
dent had had an opportunity to consider the recommendations of his
recently appointed Commission on International Trade and Investment
Policy, due in May. 1 Thus, presumably, there is time for a fresh look at
the U.S. legal commitments under the GATT.
Scope of Inquiry
It is not the purpose of this short article to argue or comment upon the
pros and cons of the particular quota legislation in question.1 2 This has
been accomplished ad nauseam by commentators, lobbyists, economists,
lawyer-advocates, etc. Nor is it the purpose to discuss the legal obligations
and procedures of the GATT in general. This has been most adequately
accomplished very recently by a number of legal scholars.13 Their works
should do a great deal toward improving and developing a GATT jurispru-
dence, which, hopefully, will provide a higher degree of certainty as to
GATT obligations in the future, notwithstanding the rather ambiguous and
uncertain enforcement or dispute settlement procedures of the GATT.14
Moreover, these works will be most helpful to those bodies presently
advocating a review of the GATT with a view to improving its structure.' 5
Rather, the specific and narrow purpose of this article is to inquire into
the reasons why neither the Congress nor the Executive felt obliged to
exhaust the remedies available to the United States within the GATT
structure to solve the import problem before taking action which, if carried
"
1 The Journal of Commerce, Wednesday, January 13, 1971, p. 1. See White House Press
Release of May 21, 1970 for a complete list of membership of the Commission, chaired by
Albert L. Williams, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the board of directors of IBM,
and for a summary of the scope of the Commission's mandate.
12For an excellent and well-balanced analysis of the pros and cons of restrictions on
imports, see Foreign Trade Bills, Analysis No. 8, July 10, 1970, American Enterprise
Institute, Washington, D. C.
3 1n the author's opinion, the most comprehensive and authoritative work on the subject
to date is the recently published book by Professor JOHN H. JACKSON of the University of
Michigan Law School, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, Bobbs-Merrill Company,
Inc., New York, 1969, pp. 698 plus appendices including text of GATT and other relevant
documents. Another interesting work with an emphasis on international economic organ-
ization is DAM, KENNETH W., THE GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGA-
NIZATION, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970, pp. 389 plus appendix containing text
of GATT. See also Hudec, Robert E., The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurispru-
dence, 4J. WORLD TRADE LAW 615 (1970).14As to this problem, see particularly Hudec, ibid.
15 For example, Senate Report No. 91- 1431, op. cit., pp. 284-286. See also, when
released, a report of the Staff of the Senate Finance Committee which asserts that the GATT
is "deficient, discriminatory and obsolete." The Journal of Commerce, Tuesday, December
22, 1970, p. 1.
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out, would have, on its face, violated one of the fundamental legal com-
mitments of the GATT, namely Article XI.
1 6
The Article XI Obligation and Exceptions Thereto
Article XI, Paragraph 1, provides:
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or
on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory
of any other contracting party.
Thus, Article XI, Paragraph 1, sets forth a clear prohibition as to the use
of quotas. However, there are a number of exceptions to that prohibition
and some procedures which may allow the suspension of this obligation.
Article XI, Paragraph 2, provides certain specific exceptions to the
obligation of Paragraph 1, namely, (1) export restrictions to relieve food
shortages, (2) restrictions necessary to the application of standards for
grading or classification, and (3) import restrictions on "any agricultural or
fisheries product" under certain circumstances.
Articles XII and XIV contain elaborate exception clauses for balance-
of-payment cases.
Article XIX authorizes the suspension of a GATT obligation by a
contracting party, including the quota obligation of Article XI, "if, as a
result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations
incurred" (herein the prohibition of quotas obligation of Article XI) a
product is being imported "in such increased quantities and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury."
Article XX provides general exceptions as to all GATT obligations,
which have been traditional in commercial treaties, permitting a contracting
party to adopt or enforce measures for some ten specifically designated
purposes, such as those "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health," and including measures "undertaken in pursuance of obligations
under any intergovernmental commodity agreement which conforms to
criteria submitted to the Contracting Parties and not disapproved by them
or which is itself so submitted and not so disapproved."
Article XXI provides that nothing in the GATT will be construed to
prevent a contracting party from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests.
161t is now generally recognized that the United States has accepted the GATT obliga-
tions. See Jackson, John H., The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in U.S. Domestic
Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249 (1967). See also House Report No. 91- 1435, op. cit., p. 51.
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Following an investigation of a complaint by a contracting party that a
benefit accruing to it under the GATT is being nullified or impaired, the
Contracting Parties may authorize, pursuant to Article XXIII, the com-
plainant to suspend the application to any other contracting party of such
GATT obligations (including the quota prohibition of Article XI) as they
determine to be appropriate.
Under Article XXV, Paragraph 5, the Contracting Parties, "in ex-
ceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for," may waive an obliga-
tion imposed on a contracting party, provided the decision is approved by a
two-thirds majority of the votes cast and the majority comprises more than
half of the contracting parties.
It probably should be added, realistically, that to the degree any GATT
obligation can be avoided without consequences, the avoidance operates in
effect as an exception. 17 A noteworthy example is the case of the "residual
quotas," that is, quotas which were originally allowed as balance-
of-payment exceptions but which are no longer justified. Fortunately, the
list of such residuals is getting shorter and should soon be eliminated.
Note should also be taken of the argument that a mere departure from a
GATT obligation is not a breach of an international obligation unless it
also entails "nullification and impairment" under Article XXIII.' 8
There are a few other GATT exceptions which are not applicable to the
United States in the circumstances under review.
It is now appropriate to analyze, in the light of the Article XI obligation
and relevant exceptions, the actions taken by the United States Congress
and the Executive, and the rationale therefor, and perhaps to close with
some modest suggestions for future efforts in this area.
Congressional Action
It seems quite clear that, in the absence of the applicability of any of the
above-enumerated exceptions, the enactment of the provisions of Title II
of H. R. 18970, namely, the quota provisions, would have violated Article
XI of the GATT. It also seems clear that the Congress was aware of this
fact. Yet, the legislative history, both in the House and Senate, nowhere
reveals an effort to justify such quota action in terms of the GATT
exceptions.19 In other words, it appears that Congress was willing to
violate the GATT flagrantly. Is this the case and was this necessary?
17See Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GA TT, op. cit., p. 539 (hereinafter referred
to as Jackson).
81d., p. 539.
19Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 91 st
Congress, 2d Session, on Tariff and Trade Proposals, 16 Parts, 1970, GPO; H. Rpt. No.
91-1435, op. cit.; Senate Hearings, op. cit.; S. Rpt. 91- 1431, op. cit.; and comments on the
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Realistically speaking, none of the above listed "exceptions" would have
been appropriate for consideration by the Congress had it desired so to
frame its action as to be consistent with the GATT, with the possible
exception of Articles XIX and XXV.
Article XIX provides in pertinent part:
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the
obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including
tariff concessions, any product is being imported into theiterritory of that
contracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to
cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like
or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect
of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to
prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part
or to withdraw or modify the concession. [Emphasis supplied.]
This GATT "escape clause" has been subject to interpretation within
the GATT. The key words relevant to this inquiry are "as a result of
unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred" and
the words "serious injury." In discussing the meaning of the former words,
Professor Jackson has stated:
Taking up the question of 'GATT obligation,' what does this encompass?
It seems to be as broad as the GATT itself. The preparatory work clearly
indicates that not only were tariff concessions intended by this phrase but the
elimination or reduction of quantitative restrictions was also included. The
language seems even broader. Since the obligation not to use quantitative
restrictions applies to almost all products, and since other obligations of
GATT do apply to all products, it appears that any product imported in
'increased' quantities could occasion the use of article XIX. That is to say,
coincidence of GATT obligation appears to be established for virtually all
products. But that still leaves open the question of cause.
One way to appraise 'cause' is to see what changes in governmental trade
barriers have occurred as a result of joining GATT or accepting some GATT
obligation. If no change has occurred after the GATT applied to a party, i.e.,
if it had no quantitative restrictions on widgets before it joined GATT, and
after it applied GATT to its trade imports in widgets increased, then arguably
one must look elsewhere for an obligation that caused the increase. One
subtle argument, however, might be simply that GATT has added to the
probability that future barriers will not be imposed and this increased security
of trade conditions caused increased imports. This would probably be hard to
prove as a 'cause' of increased imports.
The other cause requirement, that of 'unforeseen developments,' is much
more difficult to appraise: Here, not only is the casual relationship difficult to
measure, but the definition of 'unforeseen development' is hazy. This term,
drawn directly from United States treaty practice, was apparently little dis-
cussed in the preparatory work.
One of the earliest and most significant Article XIX invocations was made
by the United States with respect to hatters' furs. One controversial issue in
floors of the respective Houses of Congress appearing in various volumes of the CONGRES-
SIONAL RECORD.
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the GATT proceedings on this case was 'unforeseen developments.' In 1950,
the United States, through its Tariff Commission procedures, found that
increased imports of this product fulfilled the criteria of the escape clause, so
it withdrew a concession negotiated at Geneva in 1947. This action was
challenged by Czechoslovakia, and the GATT set up a Working Party to
review the matter. The increased imports had resulted from a change of
ladies' hat styles and the United States contended that this was an 'unfore-
seen development.' The Working Party trod a fine line. All members except
the United States agreed that 'unforeseen development' should be interpreted
to mean developments occurring after the negotiation of the relevant tariff
concession which it would not be reasonable to expect that the negotiators of
the country making the concession could and should have foreseen at the
time when the concession was negotiated. These members also agreed with
the Czechoslovakian argument that 'it is universally known that fashions are
subject to constant changes' and that the United States negotiators should
have known that fashions might change. But all members of the Working
Party except Czechoslovakia felt that 'the degree to which the change in
fashion affected the competitive situation, could not reasonably be expected
to have been foreseen by the United States' authorities in 1947,' and there-
fore the Article XIX prerequisite of 'unforeseen developments' was fulfilled.
This conclusion, of course, very much weakened the stringency of the pre-
requisites to Article XIX. Indeed, one can almost conclude that an increase
in imports can itself be an unforeseen development. If the nature of the
development can be foreseen and yet the degree of its impact on imports is
that which fulfills the 'unforeseen development' prerequisite, can this not be
the case in every substantial increase in imports? If so, there may be built
into GATT obligations through the escape clause, a limit to the allowable
increase of imports of any product. 20
As regards the "serious injury" requirement, Professor Jackson again
refers to the Hatters' Fur Case, quoting the Working Party Report and
commenting on same as follows:
Finally, the Working Party inconclusively said:
[Tihe available data support the view that increased imports had caused or
threatened some adverse effect to United States producers. Whether such a
degree of adverse effect should be considered to amount to 'serious injury' is
another question on which the data cannot be said to point convincingly in
either direction, and any view on which is essentially a matter of economic
and social judgment involving a considerable subjective element!
Since the Working Party was of the view that the party invoking Article XIX
was 'entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt,' it finally concluded that
the complainant (Czechoslovakia) had 'failed to establish that no serious
injury has been sustained or threatened.'
As one reviews this remarkable GATT report on Article XIX, it appears
quite clear that the result of the findings made was to greatly extend the scope
of the escape clause and render it available for invocation in a wide variety of
situations. It almost appears that a mere rapid increase in the proportion of
imports to the domestic production would make invocation of Article XIX
justifiable, especially when all benefit of doubt goes to the party invoking it.
The net result is to render tariff concessions and other GATT obligations less
20Jackson, op. cit., pp. 559-56 1.
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stable. The need to re-examine Article XIX with a view to obtaining greater
stability of trade concessions was memtioned in a 1963 GATT report, but no
follow-up occurred. 21
Thus, it would appear that Congress could at least have argued that, as a
result of the Article XI obligation of the United States not to impose
quotas and the increased security of trade conditions flowing therefrom,
imports of certain goods have been entering the United States in such
increasing quantities and at such low prices as to cause or threaten to cause
serious injury to domestic producers, and that Congress was therefore
justified, consistent with GATT, in suspending the Article X1 obligation
and imposing the quota provisions of H. R. 18970.22
Such an argument would be weakened by the fact that Congress had
previously delegated the domestic United States determination of es-
cape-clause relief to the United States Tariff Commission in the Trade
Expansion Act of 196223 and, arguably, it should not now circumvent that
delegation without first exhausting the remedy provided in that delegation.
211d., pp. 562-563.
22Obviously, the Congress itself would not present this argument to-the GATT. It would
be presented by the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. However,
Congress could have laid the groundwork for this argument in its legislative history. Quite
likely other contracting parties would challenge this argument and perhaps, retaliate. Then it
would be up to the CONTRACTING PARTIES (when stated in the upper case, indicating
that the contracting parties are acting as a single body, i.e., GATT-the-organization, as
distinguished from GATT-the-agreement) to resolve the dispute. See Article XIX, para. 3. By
following such a procedure, even though its argument may have been weak, the United States
would have been acting within the GATT procedures.
2376 Stat. 872; 19 U.S.C.A. 1801. The domestic escape clause provides in pertinent part
at 19 U.S.C. 1901(b)(1) and (3): "(b) (I)... the Tariff Commission shall promptly make an
investigation to determine whether, as a result in major part of concessions granted under
trade agreements, an article is being imported into the United States in such increased
quantities as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to the domestic industry producing
an article which is like or directly competitive with the imported article." "(3) For purposes of
paragraph (I), increased imports shall be considered to cause, or threaten to cause, serious
injury to the domestic industry concerned when the Tariff Commission finds that such
increased imports have been the major factor in causing, or threatening to cause, such injury."
[Emphasis supplied.]
A comparison of these domestic criteria of causation with the criteria of Article XIX of
GATT reveals significant differences in language which, through interpretation and practice,
have led to results which allow one to conclude that the domestic escape clause is much less
useful to domestic industry than would be Article XIX. Most significantly, it can be argued
that Article XIX allows a finding of injury where articles are imported in increased quantities,
not only as a result of tariff concessions, but also as a result of the obligation not to put on
quotas.
Since the enactment of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to date, there have been 19
escape-clause cases instituted under 19 U.S.C. 1901. No injury was found in the first 13 cases
through December 1969, primarily because the Tariff Commission could not find serious
injury "as a result in major part of concessions granted under trade agreements." In 1969,
some of the Commissioners adopted the "but for" rule to satisfy this criteria (but for the
concessions, imports would not be at substantially these present levels). Three of the next
four cases were decided in favor of injury, but often with evenly divided determinations, 3-3
or 2-2. The 19th case is still pending.
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Congress could respond that the GATT does not dictate how a con-
tracting party internally makes its determination under Article XIX and
that it has the authority, whether it is good practice or not, to circumvent
its delegation to the United States Tariff Commission, particularly where
the standards for escape-clause relief which it established domestically
were much more stringent than the GATT standards. However, its failure
to exhaust the remedy provided in the domestic escape clause, even though
more stringent than required by GATT, before acting outside that remedy,
may be considered unjustifiable on the international level. 24
Accordingly, the Congress itself, through the Committee on Ways and
Means of the House or the Committee on Finance of the Senate, should
have initiated a domestic escape-clause action, even if the industry in
question felt this remedy futile. 25 Then, after a Tariff Commission deter-
mination, either favorable or unfavorable and, if favorable, after action by
the President, the Congress could have determined if the relief, if any, to
the industry were considered adequate. If it were not considered adequate,
Congress would have been in a stronger position internationally to take
direct action which it could argue was justified under the more liberal
standards of Article XIX, and/or it could have amended the domestic
escape clause more closely to approach the more liberal standards of
Article XIX and brought a new action under the more liberal procedures.
This leads us to a consideration of the waiver power contained in Article
XXV, Paragraph 5, referred to above.
Quite clearly, Congress may enact legislation violative of the GATT
obligations which will be enforceable in the United States-even though a
breach of an international obligation.2 6 In fact, Congress has enacted stat-
utes which required the United States either to breach its obligation under
GATT or to obtain a waiver from GATT under circumstances in which
the grant of the waiver was more a recognition of a fait accompli than a
voluntary undertaking by the contracting parties. The most significant
example of such legislation was the amendment, in 1951, of Section 22 of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act 27 which authorized the President to in-
"An analogy may be made to the general rule of international law (exhaustion of local
remedies) that a State (herein the GATT) is not required to make reparation (herein authorize
the use of Article XIX) on a claim of an injured alien (herein the domestic industry) if the
alien has not exhausted the remedies made available to it (herein, the domestic-escape clause).
See Restatement of the Law, Second, "Foreign Relations Law of the United States." AMERI-
CAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1965, § 206. But see exception § 208(b).
25ln view of the record set forth in Footnote 23, above, it is understandable that a number
of domestic industries have considered the domestic remedy futile.26See Restatement, op. cit. § 145.
277 U.S.C. 624(a) and (b) provide in pertinent part: "(a) Whenever the Secretary of
Agriculture has reason to believe that any article or articles are being or are practically certain
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voke quotas in situations which did not satisfy any of the exceptions of
GATT, thus potentially violating Article XI.
Apparently, the Executive avoided any actions under this legislation
which would violate GATT until it obtained the GATT waiver under
Article XXV in 1955. At that time, it was pointed out that a situation in
which the United States would have to carry out the Congressional enact-
ment in violation of the GATT was bound to arise in the near future, in
which case damage to the legal principles and structure of GATT would
ensue and possibly even lead to the withdrawal of the United States from
the GATT. Under the circumstances, the waiver was granted without any
time limits or any provision for reconsideration. However, the other con-
tracting parties reserved their right of consultation and action under Article
XXIII and conduct an annual review of the United States' use of the
waiver.28
Apparently, in the instant case, the Congress was willing to enact a
quota provision in violation of GATT, and then let the Executive seek a
waiver under Article XXV from the other contracting parties, relying on
the Section-22 case as a precedent for such action. However, there is a
significant difference between the Section-22 case and the quotas of H. R.
18970. There was no possibility of the use of Article XIX (the escape
clause procedure) to alleviate the problems which were to be remedied by
the Section-22 enactment, whereas there was such a possibility, as pointed
out above, in the case of the quotas proposed in H. R. 18970. Under the
circumstances (in the light of the conditioning language of Article XXV,
Paragraph 5, namely, "exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided
for in this Agreement"), the Executive would have a difficult time arguing
for a waiver when it had not exhausted an appropriate remedy elsewhere
provided for in the Agreement, namely, the escape-clause procedure of
Article XIX. This analysis is supported by a survey of those cases in
which the Article-XXV waiver has been granted. Such survey does not
appear to include a case appropriate for the escape-clause procedure. 29
Executive Action
It seems clear that the Executive also realized the quota provisions of
to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to
render or tend to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, any program or operation
undertaken under this chapter ... he shall so advise the President..." and "(b) If... the
President finds the existence of such facts, he shall by proclamation impose such fees not in
excess of 50 per centum ad valorem or such quantitative limitations on any article or articles
which may be entered ... as he finds and declares shown by such investigation to be neces-
sary..." Note that there is no "injury to an industry" requirement so that an escape-clause
procedure would not first have to be exhausted.
28See Jackson, op. cit., pp. 735-736.
29d, pp. 545-552.
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H. R. 18970 would have violated GATT. Perhaps for this, among other
reasons, the Executive opposed the quotas on non-rubber footwear and
only reluctantly supported the textile quotas.3 0 The rationale for such
support appears to have been political and pragmatic, saving jobs in Amer-
ica. The argument was also made that the Executive sought an in-
ternational agreement, particularly with Japan, and only because those
efforts were unsuccessful did it support the textile quotas.3 1
Unlike the Congress, which is not structured to conduct international
negotiations, the Executive had a greater flexibility not only to consider the
"exceptions" to Article XI, but also actively to pursue them if appropriate.
However, in one respect it was more restricted than the Congress. It could
not advocate in GATT without Congressional authorization, escape
clause relief beyond that found under the domestic escape clause proce-
dure. However, it could actively pursue the domestic escape clause proce-
dure. It could seek a waiver under Article XXV, as pointed out above,32
and in addition it could seek relief under Article XXIII, citing the failure of
other contracting parties to carry out their obligations and asking as relief
the suspension of its obligations as regards such parties under Article XI.
What in fact has the Executive been doing in these areas? We will first
consider escape-clause action in the non-rubber footwear area, then action
in the textile area and finally under Article XXIII.
Non-rubber Footwear
As early as April 1968, at the request of President Johnson, the United
States Tariff Commission investigated the economic condition of the do-
mestic producers of non-rubber footwear and submitted its Report on
January 15, 1969. 3 Meanwhile, President Nixon had created an In-
teragency Task Force to make a comprehensive inquiry into economic
conditions in the domestic non-rubber footwear industry, with particular
reference to the effect of imports upon that industry. In view of the
President's probable need for a current assessment of the trends in imports,
the Tariff Commission on its own motion initiated another investigation to
30Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 1- 12.
3 11d, p. 267.32 Obviously, the Executive should not again be put in the position of seeking a waiver
after the legislation requiring the waiver has already become effective, as in the Section-22
case. The Congress should, at the very least, in cases in which a waiver will be necessary,
write into the legislation an effective date far enough into the future to allow the Executive to
negotiate same and perhaps to come back with some compromise acceptable to the Congress
which can then be written into the legislation before the effective date.33Non-rubber Footwear, Inv. No. 332-56, TC Pub. 276 (1969).
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supplement the Report of January 15, 1969 and came out with another
Report in December 1969.34
During this entire period the domestic non-rubber footwear industry did
not seek escape-clause relief but did seek quota legislation from the Con-
gress. This was also true of the textile industry. This reluctance to use the
escape-clause procedure most likely stems from the fact that the possibility
of finding injury under the stringent standards was very remote and, even if
found, the domestic industry did not consider the likely relief adequate.
Nonetheless, President Nixon considered it appropriate to exhaust this
possible remedy before supporting quota legislation and, accordingly, on
July 15, 1970, requested the United States Tariff Commission to conduct
an escape-clause investigation. On January 15, 1971, the Commission
submitted its Report to the President, two Commissioners finding injury in
certain types of footwear and recommending increases in tariff rates, two
other Commissioners finding no injury, and the recently appointed Com-
missioner not participating in the decision.3 5 In such an evenly divided
vote, the President may consider the affirmative recommendation as the
recommendation of the Commission. 36
Under the statute, the President has the authority to accept the Tariff
Commission recommendation, in this case in increase in tariff rates, or to
invoke, on his own initiative, a lesser or greater remedy, such as a higher or
lower increase in duty, a tariff-quota or absolute quota,37 or even an
international agreement limiting exports from foreign countries.3 How-
ever, if he proposes to take any action other than that recommended by the
Tariff Commission he must submit a report to the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate stating why he has not followed the Tariff Commission
recommendation. Those respective Houses of Congress may then by vote
require him to carry out the Tariff Commission recommendation.3 9
If the President were to invoke a remedy approved by the Congress but
which one of the contracting parties to the GATT felt exceeded the
standards of Article XIX of the GATT, that party could, under the circum-
stances, protest such remedy in the GATT and proceed to suspend, as
against the United States, substantially equivalent concessions or other
GATT obligations not disapproved by the Contracting Parties.
34Non-rubber Footwear, Inv. No. 332-62, TC Pub. 307 (1969).35Non-rubber Footwear, Inv. No. TEA-l-18, TC Pub. 359 (197 1).
3619 U.S.C. 1330(d) (I).
37 19 U. S.C. 198 1(a) (1).
3819 U.S.C. 1982.
3919 U.S.C. 1981(a) (2).
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Textiles
The textile problem has been with, not only the United States, but with
the world for some time.40 It is apparently unique in the United States
because of the number of people affected and-it follows-the high degree
of political leverage which the industry, including labor, can muster. In-
itially, efforts were made to solve this problem by international agree-
ment.4 1 These efforts have been to a degree successful -and they continue.
On October 4, 1967, the President requested the Tariff Commission to
undertake "a comprehensive investigation of the economic condition of the
United States textile and apparel industries, especially the present and
prospective impact of imports upon those industries." A report thereon
was submitted to the President on January 15, 1968.42 In the meantime,
the textile industry has continually sought quota protection from the Con-
gress. Neither the industry nor labor, nor the President, nor either House
of Congress, nor the Tariff Commission itself, appear willing to use the
escape-clause procedures as a possible remedy for the textile problem.
Also, the Executive continues its efforts to negotiate another international
textile agreement.
Article XXIII
A very understandable complaint from large segments of U.S. industry
has been directed at the so-called "residual quotas" maintained by other
nations, particularly Japan, long after they can be justified under the
GATT exceptions to Article XI. Members of this industry at times feel
their Government has let them down in not pursuing vigorously the
remedies available to the United States under Article XXIII. It should be
pointed out that the Executive has, on a number of occasions, used the
threat of invoking its rights under Article XXIII and as a result thereof has
succeeded in convincing other contracting parties to eliminate "residual
quotas" and other impediments to trade inconsistent with GATT obliga-
tions. It has had a particular problem in this regard with Japan, and
accordingly in 1968 the United States decided that it would have to obtain
substantial elimination of the remaining quantitative restrictions or consid-
er taking retaliatory action under Article XXIII. 43 This decision was
4 0For a very good legal analysis of the textile problem and the international agreements
resulting therefrom, see DAM, Op. cit., Chapter 17-"Market Disruption and Cotton Tex-
tiles," pp. 296-315.411d.
42 Textiles and Apparel, Inv. No. 332-55 (2 Vols.), TC Pub. 226.(1968).
4aSee "Written Statements and Other Material Submitted by Administration Witnesses to
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apparently temporarily shelved while efforts to negotiate an international
agreement on textiles were taking place.
Some Modest Proposals
The difficult problem which domestic industry is asking the Congress
and the Executive to solve is that of market disruption. This has been the
subject of investigation in GATT. However, GATT's general work in this
area suffered from the fact that the contracting parties spent most of their
time attempting to solve the one most acute market disruption problem,
namely, that of textiles, with special committees and international arrange-
ments.
44
Obviously, a reasonable escape-clause procedure with tariff or quota
relief is a temporary solution for a market disruption problem of modest
magnitude. 45 Long-term solutions for problems of larger magnitude seem to
be taking the form of international agreements. But here, again, there must
be care not so to over-protect as to find yourself implementing an in-
ternational trade policy running directly counter to an anti-trust policy
which is attempting to maintain free competition. 46
Admitting the need to maintain free competition, including the free
competition of imports, it is still true that a number of domestic businesses
have costs of production differing considerably from those of their foreign
competitors in the areas of labor, capital, taxation, credit, pollution control,
governmental assistance, etc., and accordingly it is only just that they,
the Committee on Ways and Means," Committee Print, 91st Congress, 2d Session, (May
1970) pp. 185- 190.
44Jackson, op. cit., pp. 570-573. In 1960, the Contracting Parties adopted a description
of market disruption as follows: "These situations generally contain the following elements in
combination: (i) a sharp and substantial increase or potential increase of imports of particular
products from particular sources; (ii) these products are offered at prices which are substan-
tially below those prevailing for similar goods of comparable quality in the market of the
importing country; (iii) there is serious damage to domestic producers or threat thereof; and
(iv) the price differentials referred to in paragraph (ii) above do not arise from governmental
intervention in the fixing or formation of prices or from dumping practices. "In some situ-
ations other elements are also present and the enumeration above is not, therefore, intended
as an exhaustive definition of market disruption." (GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 26 (1961).)-As
quoted in Jackson, id, pp. 571-572.
45Another solution for a modest market disruption problem is available under Article
XXVIII of GAT[. Paragraphs 1-3 allow a contracting party, as a matter of right every three
years, to modify or withdraw a tariff concession. Paragraph 4 allows a contracting party in
special circumstances to negotiate the modification or withdrawal of a tariff concession at any
time. The U.S. Customs Court has recently ruled in Star Industries, Inc. v. U.S., C.D. 4155,
decided December 23, 1970 that Article XXVIII does not require suspension of trade
agreement concessions on a most-favored-nation basis.
4In this connection, see the statement of Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, in the Hearing before the U.S. Tariff
Commission in the Competitive Position of U.S. Industries, November 25, 1970, Inv. No.
332-65, Official Report of Proceedings, Vol. 15.
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including their employees, be given some form of protection from sudden
serious injury. The further question is, who should bear the cost of the
protection and for how long? Further, what form should this protection
take to minimize its domino effect on free trade? These are longer-range
questions to be tackled by the President's Commission on International
Trade and Investment Policy.
However, perhaps we can glean some modest interim proposals from the
above commentary. Presumably, all would agree that the United States
Government-both the Congress and the Executive-should always act, if
at all possible, in a manner consistent with the GATT obligations. In the
present context, this means that they should first exhaust established do-
mestic procedures and then all available GATT procedures before violat-
ing Article XI.
If the domestic escape-clause procedure is so stringent that neither the
aggrieved industry nor the Government choose to use it and also is more
stringent than required by GATT, then it should be liberalized within the
limits of the GATT to make it an effective procedure. It should be noted
that the stringent aspects of the domestic escape clause are. the standards
for finding injury, not the remedies available to the President once the
injury has been found by the Tariff Commission. The remedies available to
the President include, in addition to tariff adjustment, both of the remedies
written into H. R. 18970, namely, quotas and international agreements.
Secondly, perhaps the Executive should use Article XXIII more vigor-
ously against other contracting parties who are not living up to their GATT
obligations, and request the Contracting Parties to authorize the United
States to suspend the Article-XI obligation as against those particular
offeniders.
Thirdly, the Executive should use the already existing statutory rem-
edies more vigorously, consistent with GATT, namely, dumping duties
and counter-vailing duties, both of which are more focused remedies and
less offensive than quotas.
Finally, it would be well if Congress and the Executive could work more
closely together in the future, the Congress being more sympathetic to our
international-trade obligations, and the Executive being more vigorous in
pursuing our international trade rights.
Perhaps this effort may be one of the first orders of business for the
President's newly established Council on International Economic Policy.
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[Editorial Note: The following Resolution relating to the matters dis-
cussed in Mr. Coerper's article was adopted by the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association on February 8, 1971, after consideration of
a report of the Section of International and Comparative Law.]
Be it resolved, that the American Bar Association urges the President
and the Congress of the United States to recognize the conflict which
appears to exist between the import quota provisions of proposed legisla-
tion such as H.R. 18970 (91st Congress) and existing obligations of the
United States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and, if such conflict is found to exist in fact, to evaluate carefully the
impact of such proposed import quota legislation upon the international
obligations of the United States under the GATT; and
Be it further resolved, that the appropriate Officers of the Association
advise the President and the Congress of the Association's concern as
expressed in this resolution.
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